We absolutely agree Christopher. We are always on the look out for the "baited ambush." While such tricks are beyond the capacity of most enemies it is always best to plan for the worst-case scenario and assume you are facing a highly-skilled enemy. Great point once again and feel free to share additional thoughts and feedback.
Following on from the previous insightful comments, I wonder how landmine and IED threats factor into troop movements. These threats could be alongside what is described in the article, in probable ambush sites, and in other areas of interest.
Outstanding points. The danger of encountering hidden mines and obstacles is particularly high when stumbling upon defensive positions where the enemy has had time to identify likely avenues of approach. IEDs and booby traps have of course also become increasingly relevant in COIN operations since the start of the GWOT. You are correct that many tactics changed as insurgents learned our TTPs and set up traps and baited/complex ambushes accordingly. Urban tactics were perhaps affected most of all with an increased emphasis on delayed/deliberate entry or even forgoing building assaults all together in favor of a "tactical call out." Thank you again for bringing up this important insight and feel free to add additional thoughts and comments.
I'm an 80's vintage Australian ex-infantryman. We obsessively trained the pin and flank drill at section, platoon and company level.
In those days, after WW2, Malaysia, Borneo and Vietnam the Australian Army was entirely focussed on close range jungle warfare. That's pretty much all we did, and that mitigated some of the problems you discussed here. In particular, when fighting in dense jungle, contact ranges are remarkably compressed. At section and platoon level we normally trained for contact at ranges of 10-50m, because that's as far as you can see in dense jungle. So, waiting for the flanking team to bound 200-300m never happened because an enemy position 300m away might as well be on another planet.
All that being said, all training also emphasised that the drills were just a starting point for use in an ideal world, and would have to be adapted for enemy forces who manoeuvred, attempted to suppress and flank you etc.
Thank you for a very interesting article. It brought back many, many memories.
Thank you for the insightful comments LSWCHP. You are absolutely correct that terrain has a critically important impact on tactics that many modern U.S. manuals overlook. The book our article came from is called "Squad-Level Infantry RURAL Tactics," a distinction not made in most U.S. Army manuals. The Army just has one squad/platoon tactics manual when in our view there should ideally be separate manuals for rural, urban, jungle, mountain, desert and arctic environments. We can also say from the experience we have working with the Australian military that you guys know your stuff when it comes to jungle warfare.
Going back to your comment, I think the key words are "obsessively trained." In some ways you point out a deeper truth that our article didn't focus on. The deeper problem doesn't have so much to do with whether you train using battle drills or something else, but rather are you TRAINING in the first place and how hard are you training? The cases we mention where units misunderstand battle drills and merely "follow the checklist" are also not likely spending significant time and effort training. If a unit trains with the grit and determination that your unit did they will likely end up doing things in the right way. If you put enough effort and time into training you figure things out much more quickly.
However, in order for that "figuring out" to take place there is one key ingredient and that is at least some degree of a culture of adaptability, mission command, and empowering of subordinate leaders. Once again, our experience with the Australian military suggests that you guys are particularly good in that area. If a unit has the wrong culture and mindset it will have trouble learning and improving no matter how much time it spends training.
Thank you so much again for the insights and feel free to share additional ideas and feedback.
Empowering of subordinates (and not just leaders) is critical to combat effectiveness, but this also implies more training. Empowering unskilled troops can be dangerous.
We trained (as far as possible...there's only so much time) at least one and sometimes two levels above our nominal roles. As a private I was trained to run a section. I could navigate in the jungle, call in mortars and artillery and take over the section if necessary when the section commander became ineffective. We were all expected to be somewhat able to do that, because the reality is that leaders do get knocked out, and if everybody freezes like rabbits when thst happens then losing a leader can disable an entire unit.
As for mission command, we didn't call it that back in the day, it was just getting the job done. Troops at all levels were expected to be intelligent, independent, adaptable and capable of whatever improvisation was need to achieve the task. In a decade of service I never once ran across a situation involving lengthy, rigid detailed orders. There was structure and SOPs of course, but competence was assumed at all levels, and it was generally a valid assumption.
Truly inspiring and right on target. If only more units trained the way you guys did. I also completely agree about the dangers of "empowering" subordinates that do not have the proper training or attributes to earn that empowerment. In addition, to practice mission command (or "get the job done") units do not just require thorough training but the training must reinforce exactly the sort of mindset and attributes that your unit embodied. Subordinates must be allowed to take risks and make mistakes (within reason) or they can never learn and grow. Great comments once again. We look forward to hearing more from you soon!
I wish my troop leaders and section commanders saw this. Practicing section attack drills in basic makes sense, but in my brief service experience so far I have seen the ol' reliable sequence executed much like a choreography both on blank and live fire FTXs, whether it is normal unit training or promotion course scenarios.
Thank you so much for the comments Lizard. We are glad the article rang true for you. The challenge that you faced as a combat leader is extremely common across all NATO forces. The vast majority of units do execute traditional battle drills in a very robotic, scripted way and it can be very difficult to break people out of that way of thinking. Are you still serving or are you retired at this point? We only ask because if you are still in we have some additional resources we would be happy to send that might be helpful for your unit's training.
I am serving, and to be honest I'm actually just a junior enlisted soldier, just autistically passionate about all things military and history lmao I have been lucky to see the dynamics described in the essay first hand because I found myself helping several NCOs in their promotion pipelines by simple virtue of where I have been stationed, and also how my institution is run in general. That being said, I would still be very happy to look at what you were referring to and to suggest the blog to my chain of command... although here there is a significant divide between officers and enlisted people
While muscle memory is important “ambush right!” “Ambush front!” The scenario discussed here leaves out the T/E. Personally rather than flank to buy time and having the maneuver element out risking an uncertain future, if there are additional organic weapons that force multiply like the M79, M203 and heavy automatic weapons, preplanned mortar fires that could be adjusted than staying out and using those fires to gain time to figure out what the Hell is really happening has appeal. Fire team rushes from covered positions to covered positions has it’s advantages and carries with it a sense of agression the bad guys may not like. METT comes to mind surely that was taken into consideration. Wider stepping out the wire. All great stuff for keeping the mind sharp and the iron sharper.
Great comments Charles. We agree completely and some of our upcoming articles on this topic (as well as the complete book) make very similar points to yours. Units often lack tactical patience and are all to eager to flank. As you point out, if you have superior firepower (and especially if you occupy better terrain) the best option initially is sometimes to remain in place and attack by fire while continuing to evaluate the battlefield situation. Great points. Thank you again and feel free to offer additional insights and feedback.
The intent of the enemy’s initial contact maybe to force you to flank. The assault force then ends up in an engagement area.
You have to train leaders to assess the situation and make a decision
We absolutely agree Christopher. We are always on the look out for the "baited ambush." While such tricks are beyond the capacity of most enemies it is always best to plan for the worst-case scenario and assume you are facing a highly-skilled enemy. Great point once again and feel free to share additional thoughts and feedback.
Following on from the previous insightful comments, I wonder how landmine and IED threats factor into troop movements. These threats could be alongside what is described in the article, in probable ambush sites, and in other areas of interest.
Outstanding points. The danger of encountering hidden mines and obstacles is particularly high when stumbling upon defensive positions where the enemy has had time to identify likely avenues of approach. IEDs and booby traps have of course also become increasingly relevant in COIN operations since the start of the GWOT. You are correct that many tactics changed as insurgents learned our TTPs and set up traps and baited/complex ambushes accordingly. Urban tactics were perhaps affected most of all with an increased emphasis on delayed/deliberate entry or even forgoing building assaults all together in favor of a "tactical call out." Thank you again for bringing up this important insight and feel free to add additional thoughts and comments.
I'm an 80's vintage Australian ex-infantryman. We obsessively trained the pin and flank drill at section, platoon and company level.
In those days, after WW2, Malaysia, Borneo and Vietnam the Australian Army was entirely focussed on close range jungle warfare. That's pretty much all we did, and that mitigated some of the problems you discussed here. In particular, when fighting in dense jungle, contact ranges are remarkably compressed. At section and platoon level we normally trained for contact at ranges of 10-50m, because that's as far as you can see in dense jungle. So, waiting for the flanking team to bound 200-300m never happened because an enemy position 300m away might as well be on another planet.
All that being said, all training also emphasised that the drills were just a starting point for use in an ideal world, and would have to be adapted for enemy forces who manoeuvred, attempted to suppress and flank you etc.
Thank you for a very interesting article. It brought back many, many memories.
Thank you for the insightful comments LSWCHP. You are absolutely correct that terrain has a critically important impact on tactics that many modern U.S. manuals overlook. The book our article came from is called "Squad-Level Infantry RURAL Tactics," a distinction not made in most U.S. Army manuals. The Army just has one squad/platoon tactics manual when in our view there should ideally be separate manuals for rural, urban, jungle, mountain, desert and arctic environments. We can also say from the experience we have working with the Australian military that you guys know your stuff when it comes to jungle warfare.
Going back to your comment, I think the key words are "obsessively trained." In some ways you point out a deeper truth that our article didn't focus on. The deeper problem doesn't have so much to do with whether you train using battle drills or something else, but rather are you TRAINING in the first place and how hard are you training? The cases we mention where units misunderstand battle drills and merely "follow the checklist" are also not likely spending significant time and effort training. If a unit trains with the grit and determination that your unit did they will likely end up doing things in the right way. If you put enough effort and time into training you figure things out much more quickly.
However, in order for that "figuring out" to take place there is one key ingredient and that is at least some degree of a culture of adaptability, mission command, and empowering of subordinate leaders. Once again, our experience with the Australian military suggests that you guys are particularly good in that area. If a unit has the wrong culture and mindset it will have trouble learning and improving no matter how much time it spends training.
Thank you so much again for the insights and feel free to share additional ideas and feedback.
Empowering of subordinates (and not just leaders) is critical to combat effectiveness, but this also implies more training. Empowering unskilled troops can be dangerous.
We trained (as far as possible...there's only so much time) at least one and sometimes two levels above our nominal roles. As a private I was trained to run a section. I could navigate in the jungle, call in mortars and artillery and take over the section if necessary when the section commander became ineffective. We were all expected to be somewhat able to do that, because the reality is that leaders do get knocked out, and if everybody freezes like rabbits when thst happens then losing a leader can disable an entire unit.
As for mission command, we didn't call it that back in the day, it was just getting the job done. Troops at all levels were expected to be intelligent, independent, adaptable and capable of whatever improvisation was need to achieve the task. In a decade of service I never once ran across a situation involving lengthy, rigid detailed orders. There was structure and SOPs of course, but competence was assumed at all levels, and it was generally a valid assumption.
I can't imagine running an army any other way.
Truly inspiring and right on target. If only more units trained the way you guys did. I also completely agree about the dangers of "empowering" subordinates that do not have the proper training or attributes to earn that empowerment. In addition, to practice mission command (or "get the job done") units do not just require thorough training but the training must reinforce exactly the sort of mindset and attributes that your unit embodied. Subordinates must be allowed to take risks and make mistakes (within reason) or they can never learn and grow. Great comments once again. We look forward to hearing more from you soon!
I wish my troop leaders and section commanders saw this. Practicing section attack drills in basic makes sense, but in my brief service experience so far I have seen the ol' reliable sequence executed much like a choreography both on blank and live fire FTXs, whether it is normal unit training or promotion course scenarios.
Thank you so much for the comments Lizard. We are glad the article rang true for you. The challenge that you faced as a combat leader is extremely common across all NATO forces. The vast majority of units do execute traditional battle drills in a very robotic, scripted way and it can be very difficult to break people out of that way of thinking. Are you still serving or are you retired at this point? We only ask because if you are still in we have some additional resources we would be happy to send that might be helpful for your unit's training.
I am serving, and to be honest I'm actually just a junior enlisted soldier, just autistically passionate about all things military and history lmao I have been lucky to see the dynamics described in the essay first hand because I found myself helping several NCOs in their promotion pipelines by simple virtue of where I have been stationed, and also how my institution is run in general. That being said, I would still be very happy to look at what you were referring to and to suggest the blog to my chain of command... although here there is a significant divide between officers and enlisted people
While muscle memory is important “ambush right!” “Ambush front!” The scenario discussed here leaves out the T/E. Personally rather than flank to buy time and having the maneuver element out risking an uncertain future, if there are additional organic weapons that force multiply like the M79, M203 and heavy automatic weapons, preplanned mortar fires that could be adjusted than staying out and using those fires to gain time to figure out what the Hell is really happening has appeal. Fire team rushes from covered positions to covered positions has it’s advantages and carries with it a sense of agression the bad guys may not like. METT comes to mind surely that was taken into consideration. Wider stepping out the wire. All great stuff for keeping the mind sharp and the iron sharper.
Great comments Charles. We agree completely and some of our upcoming articles on this topic (as well as the complete book) make very similar points to yours. Units often lack tactical patience and are all to eager to flank. As you point out, if you have superior firepower (and especially if you occupy better terrain) the best option initially is sometimes to remain in place and attack by fire while continuing to evaluate the battlefield situation. Great points. Thank you again and feel free to offer additional insights and feedback.